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INTRODUCTION
Without an attorney's aid, the victim of civil rights violations
will most likely gain no relief. Consider the following hypothetical:
Joe, a homeless man eager to improve his lot, seeks to
supplement his high school education by taking advantage of the
resources of the public library located three blocks from the back
alley where he often spends his nights. The library, upon receiv-
ing complaints from library patrons who claim to be disturbed by
Joe's presence, expels Joe and bars him from reentering the
library on the grounds that only those who can supply the library
with a home address are permitted to use the library's facilities.
In fact, the library enforces this policy only against black would-
be patrons; Joe's expulsion resulted not from his creating a dis-
turbance, but from his being black. Joe brings suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the denial of his equal protection rights,
seeking both injunctive and monetary relief. Joe cannot afford to
pay for legal services; yet an attorney is willing to take Joe's case
because of the award of attorney's fees he knows will be forth-
coming if Joe's suit is successful.
While the suit is pending, Joe gets a job and earns enough
to rent an apartment. Upon supplying the library with his new
home address, Joe gains access to the library; he must drop his
claim for injunctive relief. The jury later determines that although
Joe was denied equal protection, he suffered no compensable
harm. Accordingly, the trial judge enters judgment on Joe's be-
half, awarding him nominal damages. Joe then brings an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, seeking an award of attorney's fees
incurred in the litigation of his civil rights suit.
In a 1976 Senate Report,' the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
1. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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recognized the importance of awarding attorney's fees to civil
rights plaintiffs like Joe, who cannot afford legal representation,
yet have valid civil rights claims, the enforcement of which is in
the public interest.2 To encourage such plaintiffs to bring actions
to enforce their rights, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Act of 1976,' amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988. With
respect to the awarding of attorney's fees, section 1988 now pro-
vides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public
Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688], or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d--4], the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Regrettably, the term "prevailing party" is, without proper context,
ambiguous. As such, Justice Scalia's assertion that "[r]espect for
ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some
relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail"5
is difficult to accept. Without further guidance, ordinary language
could just as easily require merely that a plaintiff have an issue
resolved in his favor before he can be said to "prevail."
Because of the ambiguity, understanding what class of parties
Congress intended to reward with attorney's fees requires an
awareness of the proper context for the term "prevailing par-
ty"-i.e., the legal climate in which Congress passed the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Act and the legislative history of the Act.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has for the most part ignored
these crucial interpretative aids. Consequently, the Court has
stifled Congress's aspiration to provide citizens with the ability to
vindicate their rights where such vindications help to secure the
rights of all.
Part I of this Note examines the circumstances leading to the
passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 and the
legislative history of the Act. This examination reveals that in
order to carry out the congressional policy inherent in the Act of
5908.
2. See id. at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
5. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987).
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encouraging the public-benefitting private enforcement of civil
rights laws, courts should consider the public benefit, if any, gener-
ated by a civil rights plaintiff's suit in determining whether and to
what extent the plaintiff "prevailed."
Part II charts the evolution of the Supreme Court's treatment
of the Act, examining City of Riverside v. Rivera,6 Hewitt v.
Helms, Rhodes v. Stewart,8 and Farrar v. Hobby.9 Currently, a
civil rights plaintiff is not held to have "prevailed" unless he has
reaped some private benefit as a result of having brought his civil
rights suit; no weight is given to any public benefit a plaintiff's suit
may have engendered.
Part III argues for a reformulation of the "prevailing party"
test. Under the Court's current interpretation of the Act's "prevail-
ing party" language, Joe would not receive an award of attorney's
fees. The Court should adopt a new test that considers whether a
plaintiff's civil rights suit has generated any public benefit, both
when determining whether the plaintiff "prevailed" and when
analyzing the extent to which the plaintiff has "prevailed." Under
such a test, Joe and other "private attorneys general" who success-
fully vindicate their rights in court would qualify as "prevailing
parties."
I. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT: "PRIVATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL"
An examination of the circumstances leading to the adoption
of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 and of the legisla-
tive history of the Act reveals that one of the basic principles
underlying the adoption of the Act is that civil rights plaintiffs are
relied upon to act as "private attorneys general"1 in the prosecu-
tion of civil rights violations. The significance of the common
6. 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
7. 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
8. 488 U.S. 1 (1988).
9. 113 S. CL 566 (1992).
10. The notion of a "private attorney general" was first recognized by Judge Jerome
Frank in Associated Industries of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
Judge Frank wrote that
[i]nstead of designating the Attorney General, or some other public officer, tobring [an action], Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any
non-official persons, or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority
to bring a suit . . .even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest.
Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.
Id. at 704 (footnote omitted).
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reference to civil rights plaintiffs as "private attorneys general" in
the House and Senate Reports" on the Act is underscored by the
Supreme Court's holding in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society2 that courts may not, without congressional authori-
zation, award attorney's fees to plaintiffs based on a common law
"private attorney general" theory.'3
A. The Circumstances of the Act's Adoption: Alyeska's Rejection
of the Common Law "Private Attorney General" Doctrine
In Alyeska, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a "private
attorney general" exception to the "American Rule,"" which re-
quires each party in a civil action to bear its own attorney's fees.
The Court would not countenance the D.C. Circuit's recognition
that
[t]he violation of an important public policy may involve little by
way of actual damages, so far as a single individual is concerned,
or little in comparison with the cost of vindication .... In such
instances public policy may suggest an award of costs that will
remove the burden from the shoulders of the plaintiff seeking to
vindicate the public right.' '
Rather, it explained that insofar as the courts operate under the
"American Rule" "the circumstances under which attorney's fees
are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in
making those awards are matters for Congress to determine."' 6
11. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1976); S. REP. NO. 1011,
supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910.
12. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
13. Id. at 262.
14. Id. at 247. The Alyeska Court first focused on the difference between the
"American Rule" and the common British practice of having the defeated litigant pay
both litigants' attorney's fees. Id. Neither British nor American common law allows the
awarding of attorney's fees; it is only pursuant to broad legislative authorization that the
"British Rule" provides for the awarding of attorney's fees. See id.
15. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting
Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972)). The plaintiff had obtained an
injunction against a defendant who purportedly intended to issue a certain right-of-way
and certain land use permits in violation of section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 242 (citing Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, § 28, 41 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1988))).
16. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 262.
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With this explanation, the Court, asking for "legislative guid-
ance," 17 invited Congress to instruct the courts as to which
fee-shifting policies Congress wished the courts to enforce. The
Court did not order Congress to dispose of the common law "pri-
vate attorney general" theory in providing for the availability of
attorney's fees awards; rather, the Court requested Congress to
provide a limited domain in which the courts could apply the
theory.18
B. The House and Senate Reports on the. Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Act of 1976: Guides to the Proper Interpretation of the
"Prevailing Party" Language
With the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, Congress
accepted the Court's invitation to instruct the courts with regard to
the awarding of attorney's fees. In amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
Congress authorized courts to award attorney's fees to parties who
"prevail" in suits brought under any of several specified sections of
the United States Code."
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 Plaintiffs as "Private Attorneys General."
The legislative history clearly indicates that the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 was passed to counteract the limiting
effects of the Supreme Court's holding in Alyeska that the courts
do not have the authority to invoke a "private attorney general"
exception to the "American Rule" without specific legislative
guidance. Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to revive the
17. Id. at 263-64.
18. Id. In noting that Congress has the authority to mandate a scheme of awarding
attorney's fees resembling the common British practice, see id. at 262, the Alyeska Court
was consistent with prior judicial practice. When U.S. courts have found a legislative
intent to mandate the awarding of attorney's fees to the victorious party, they have duti-
fully enforced the scheme. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1973) (awarding
attorney's fees pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, § 102,
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1988)); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 939 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir.
1991) (awarding attorney's fees pursuant to the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988)); Cazalas v. Department of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983)
(awarding attorney's fees pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (1988)).
19. See supra text accompanying note 4.
20. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5909 (stating that "[t]he purpose of this amendment is to remedy anomalous gaps in our
civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society").
[Vol. 42:706
PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
"private attorney general" doctrine; the House and Senate Reports
each noted the need for private enforcement of the civil rights
laws to which section 1988 pertains.21
Congress's characterization of civil rights plaintiffs as "private
attorneys general" indicates its recognition that the enforcement of
an individual's civil rights at the expense of the rights violator
deters further civil rights violations.' The general public certainly
is able to benefit from an action even if the individual bringing
the action is unable personally to benefit. In amending section
1988, Congress focused not on the benefits received by individual
plaintiffs in civil rights cases, but on the benefits generated for the
public by plaintiffs who would not have brought cases without the
relief provided for by section 1988.2 It follows, then, that any
such plaintiff may "prevail" by encouraging a public benefit, even
if the plaintiff's only private relief is for the plaintiff qua a mem-
ber of society.
2. Qualifying the Level of Success Required to Attain "Pre-
vailing Party" Status: Vindication of Rights. The success of a law-
suit can be measured in various ways. A plaintiff might be said to
have "succeeded" if: 1) he has received precisely the relief he
requested; 2) he has received any tangible or equitable relief at
all; or 3) he merely has had his rights vindicated by virtue of the
court's holding in his favor, regardless of the nature of any relief
which might accompany such a vindication.
An examination of the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 reveals that the third category of suc-
cess-a mere "vindication of rights"-is sufficient to earn a civil
21. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11, at 1 ("The effective enforcement of
Federal civil rights statutes depends largely an the efforts of private citizens."); S. REp.
No. 1011, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910 ("All of these civil
rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an
essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the
important Congressional policies which these laws contain.").
22. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11, at 2 (referring with approval to courts
that "prior to Alyeska . . . had allowed fees on the theory that civil rights plaintiffs act
as 'private attorneys general' in eliminating discriminatory practices adversely affecting all
citizens"); S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910
(expressing the importance of having civil rights plaintiffs vindicate their rights so that
"those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws [do not] proceed with impunity").
23. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11, passim; S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1,
passim.
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rights plaintiff "prevailing party" status. The Senate Report ex-
plained that "[i]f private citizens are to be able to assert their civil
rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are
not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportu-
nity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
court."''i Similarly, the House Report indicated that a plaintiff
need not obtain relief on the merits of his case before he is a
"prevailing party" within the meaning of the Act. It recognized
that "in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses,
available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the
damage remedy. Consequently[,j awarding counsel fees to prevail-
ing plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and neces-
sary if Federal civil and constitutional rights are to be adequately
protected."'' Congress mandated that a civil rights plaintiff may
be said to have "prevailed" despite having failed to obtain any
relief on the merits of his action if he has obtained a legal pro-
nouncement that his rights were violated. This least onerous means
of qualifying as a "prevailing party"-i.e., achieving merely a vin-
dication of rights-is wholly consistent with the "private attorney
general" theory underlying the Act: A vindication of a plaintiff's
rights coupled with an award of attorney's fees informs those who
might violate the civil rights of any citizen that their unlawful
conduct will be prosecuted at their own expense, thereby providing
the public benefit of deterring such unlawful conduct.
II. THE COURT'S DOCTRINE: PRIVATE RELIEF
The lower federal courts have struggled with the notion of
"prevailing parties"; on occasion, the Supreme Court has provid-
24. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910
(emphasis added).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11, at 9 (citations omitted); see also id. at 8
("[T]he word 'prevailing' is not intended to require the entry of a final order before fees
may be recovered . . . . '[T]he entry of any order that determines substantial rights of
the parties may be an appropriate occasion upon which to consider the propriety of an
award of counsel fees. ) (quoting Bradley v. Richmond Seh. Bd., 416 U.S. 696,
722 n.28 (1974)).
26. See, e.g., Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
a plaintiff who is awarded nominal damages "prevails"); Simien v. City of San Antonio,
809 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1987) (requiring that a party succeed on the "central issue"
and-receive the primary relief sought in order to "prevail" within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1988); Gingras v. Lloyd, 740 F.2d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring that a party
succeed on any significant issue and receive some of the benefits he sought in order to
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ed some direction." However, in providing that direction, the
Court has ignored the "private attorney general" intent behind the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976. As a result of this disre-
gard, the Court has adopted a faulty standard for determining
when a civil rights plaintiff is eligible for an award of attorney's
fees, focusing only on the private relief which a plaintiff obtains.
City of Riverside v. Rivera,s a comparatively early case, sur-
vives as something of an anomaly. In Rivera, the Supreme Court,
in upholding an award of attorney's fees more than seven times
greater than the compensatory and punitive damages award in the
underlying civil rights suit,' provided an examination of the Act's
legislative history since unencountered in the Court's opinions, be
they majority opinions, concurrences, or dissents.
Since Rivera, the Court has not rejected the analysis of the
legislative history presented by the Rivera plurality-it has simply
ignored it. In two notable cases, the Court, ignoring the Act's
legislative history, established and then expanded its misinterpreta-
tion of the Act's "prevailing party" language. In Hewitt v.
Helms,' the Court held that a civil rights plaintiff must achieve
some significant private relief before qualifying for a section 1988
attorney's fees award. In Rhodes v. Stewart,31 the Court estab-
lished further that a declaratory judgment in a civil rights
plaintiff's favor is not sufficient to qualify that plaintiff for an
attorney's fees award unless it is actually taken advantage of by
that plaintiff.
Most recently, in Farrar v. Hobby,32 the Court further con-
founded the congressional intent behind the Act by ostensibly de-
claring a plaintiff to be a "prevailing party" after being awarded
nominal damages, but then summarily denying that the plaintiff
"prevail").
27. See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992) (holding that a nominal damages
award is sufficient to qualify a plaintiff as a "prevailing party"); Texas State Teachers
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989) (holding that a party need only
succeed on some "significant issue" to "prevail"); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988)
(per curiam) (holding that a declaratory judgment, absent private relief, is insufficient to
qualify a plaintiff as a "prevailing party"); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987) (holding
that a plaintiff must obtain private relief to "prevail").
28. 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
29. Id. at 564-65 (plurality opinion).
30. 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
31. 488 U.S. 1 (1988).
32. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
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might be entitled to attorney's fees. The Court based its holding
on the seemingly irrelevant point that the tangible relief obtained
was minuscule compared to the damages prayed for by the plain-
tiff. Furthermore, although admitting that a "private attorney gen-
eral" theory underlies the Act, Justice O'Connor, in a fifth-vote
concurrence, refused to allow the district court that originally
awarded the attorney's fees an opportunity to articulate a public
benefit basis for its award and refused also to recognize the
plaintiffs' vindication of their constitutional rights as a potential
substantial public benefit.
A. City of Riverside v. Rivera
In City of Riverside v. Rivera,' the Court considered not
whether attorney's fees should be awarded at all, but what factors
may be taken into consideration in determining the appropriate
fee award once it has been determined that some award is appro-
priate. In Rivera, civil rights plaintiffs had been awarded $33,350 in
compensatory and punitive damages.' The issue before the Court
was whether a subsequent award of $245,456.25 in attorney's fees
was reasonably proportionate to the degree of the plaintiffs' "suc-
cess" in the underlying suit. 5
The Rivera Court insisted that the degree of a civil rights
plaintiff's "success" cannot be determined simply by measuring the
amount of damages received by the plaintiff. Rather, "[r]egardless
of the form of relief he actually obtains, a successful civil rights
plaintiff often secures important social benefits that are not reflect-
ed in nominal or relatively small damages awards."' Declaring
that "[a] rule that limits attorney's fees in civil rights cases to a
proportion of the damages awarded would seriously undermine
Congress' purpose in enacting § 1988,"' the Court held that a
plaintiff's "success," for section 1988 purposes, is a function not
just of the amount of relief that the plaintiff obtained for himself
in the underlying suit, but also of the nature of the benefits that
accrue to the public as a result of the plaintiff's suit. Indeed, the
Rivera plurality explicitly recognized that a plaintiff who obtains
33. 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
34. Id. at 564-65 (plurality opinion).
35. See id at 565-67.
36. Id. at 574.
37. Ia at 576.
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relief in a civil rights lawsuit "does so not for himself alone but
also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Con-
gress considered of the highest importance."'
B. Hewitt v. Helms
Only a year after the Rivera decision, the Court began on its
course of wholly disregarding the Act's legislative history. In
Hewitt v. Helms, 9 the Court, faced with the Act's facially ambigu-
ous language, invented its own definition of "prevailing party."
Since Hewitt, the Court has continued to pile misinterpretation
upon misinterpretation.
Hewitt arose from the alleged denial of Aaron Helms's due
process rights. A prison riot had occurred while Helms was an
inmate at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Hun-
tington. A prison hearing committee, relying solely on the testimo-
ny of a correctional officer's recollection of an undisclosed
informant's statements, found Helms guilty of misconduct for strik-
ing an officer during the riot. Pursuant to the finding of guilt,
Helms was sentenced to six months' disciplinary restrictive con-
finement. Helms brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against vari-
ous prison officials for violating his due process rights: first, in
failing to provide him with a prompt hearing on his misconduct
charge; and second, in basing his guilt solely on uncorroborated
hearsay testimony °
The district court rendered summary judgment against Helms
several months after his release from prison.41 The court of ap-
peals reversed, finding, in particular, that the conviction of Helms
on the misconduct charge was based on hearsay evidence, and that
Helms had therefore been denied due process.'2 The court of ap-
peals instructed the district court to enter summary judgment for
Helms on this second due process claim if an immunity defense
could not be established.43
38. Id. at 575 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11, at 2 (quoting Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))).
39. 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
40. Id. at 757.
41. Id
42. Id at 758.
43. Id.
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On 'emand, Helms sought only to recover monetary damages.
The district court denied Helms any remedy, granting summary
judgment to the defendants on the basis of their qualified immuni-
ty.' On appeal, Helms sought both monetary damages and equi-
table relief in the form of expunction of his misconduct conviction
from his record.' While this appeal was pending, the Pennsyl-
vania Bureau of Corrections adopted regulations governing the use
of information from confidential sources in inmate disciplinary
proceedings. ' The court of appeals then affirmed the district
court's decision.
After that defeat, Helms sought to recover attorney's fees
under section 1988 in the district court. The district court rejected
Helms's claim, denying Helms any compensatory damages remedy
because of the defendants' qualified immunity, and denying
Helms's request for the equitable relief of having the misconduct
conviction expunged because his having been released from prison
made this request moot. 7 The Third Circuit reversed, finding
Helms to be a "prevailing party" because its "prior holding that
Helms's constitutional rights were violated was 'a form of judicial
relief which serve[d] to affirm the plaintiff's assertion that the
defendants' actions [had been] unconstitutional and which [would]
serve as a standard of conduct to guide prison officials in the
future.'"" Furthermore, the Third Circuit directed the district
court to consider whether Helms's suit had been a "catalyst" for
the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections' revision of its regulations
governing inmate disciplinary hearings, and if so, to reconsider
whether Helms's suit's "catalyst" status entitled Helms to
attorney's fees."'
The Third Circuit's decision-to remand to the district court
to consider whether either its pronouncement that Helms's consti-
tutional rights had been violated or Helms's suit's potential "cata-
lyst" status qualified Helms for an award of attorney's fees-was
reversed by the Supreme Court. After observing that a plaintiff
must "receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id at 759.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting Helms v. Hewitt, 780 F.2d 367, 370 (3d Cir. 1986)).
49. Id.
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he can be said to prevail,"' the Court asserted that "Helms ob-
tained no relief .... No injunction or declaratory judgment was
entered in his favor. Nor did Helms obtain relief without benefit
of a formal judgment-for example, through a consent decree or
settlement."51 Helms argued that the Third Circuit's prior holding
that the disciplinary proceeding was unconstitutional had consti-
tuted a "vindication of rights,"'52 qualifying him as a "prevailing
party" under section 1988. The Court rejected this argument, as-
serting that a judicial pronouncement constitutes relief on the mer-
its only if it settles "some dispute which affects the behavior of the
defendant towards the plaintiff."' Helms's "vindication of rights"
argument failed because the vindication of Helms's rights had had
no effect on the behavior of the prison officials towards Helms.
Similarly, the Court dismissed Helms's "catalyst" argument. In
rejecting the argument, the Court did not invoke standards estab-
lishing a threshold type of benefit or a threshold degree of causali-
ty between a suit and some benefit. Instead, the Court based its
holding that Helms was not entitled to "prevailing party" status
under a "catalyst" theory on its assertion that by the time the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections had amended its regulations,
Helms had been released from prison and therefore "[had] not
and could not [have gotten] redress from promulgation of the
informant-testimony regulations."' The Court held that since
Helms had not benefitted from the promulgation of the new regu-
lations, he could not be considered to have "prevailed."55
In insisting that Helms would have had to benefit personally
from his suit's outcome before he could qualify as a "prevailing
party," the Court failed to value, or even to consider, the immedi-
ate effect which the adoption of the new regulations had had on
every other inmate in a Pennsylvania prison. The Court paid no
heed to Congress's classification of civil rights plaintiffs as "private
attorneys general" and consequently misinterpreted section 1988's
"prevailing party" language as making private benefit a prerequi-
site to attorney's fees awards.
50. Id. at 760.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 761 (citation omitted).
53. Id. As noted above, the Court held that a plaintiff must "receive at least some
relief on the merits" to qualify as a "prevailing party."
54. Id. at 763.
55. Id.
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C. Rhodes v. Stewart
The following year, the Court further limited the class of
plaintiffs that may qualify as "prevailing parties." In Rhodes v.
Stewart,' the Court held that even if a court awards a civil rights
plaintiff equitable relief, that plaintiff is not a "prevailing party"
unless he actually takes advantage of the equitable relief.
Rhodes arose out of a complaint filed by Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction inmates Albert Reese and Larry
Stewart under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, who alleged First and Fourteenth
Amendment violations by prison officials who had denied them
permission to subscribe to a magazine. ' The district court ruled
that the officials had failed to provide Reese and Stewart proce-
dural and substantive due process in denying their requests, and
ordered the officials to comply with proper procedural and sub-
stantive standards; but it did not issue its opinion and accompany-
ing order until after Reese had died and Stewart had been re-
leased from custody.' Two months after issuing its opinion and
accompanying order, the district court awarded attorney's fees to
Reese and Stewart. 9 The Sixth Circuit upheld the award of
attorney's fees, noting that unlike the plaintiff in Hewitt, Reese
and Stewart had received declaratory relief.'
The Supreme Court found the Sixth Circuit's characterization
of the district court's ruling as a declaratory judgment to be inap-
posite. The Court asserted that a declaratory judgment, like any
other judgment, "will constitute relief, for purposes of § 1988, if,
and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the
plaintiff."61 Since neither plaintiff had been in custody when the
district court issued its order, they had not had the opportunity to
enjoy the improved treatment mandated by the district court.
With Rhodes, the Court established that a civil rights plaintiff
needs not only to have been granted a judicial remedy, but also to
have taken advantage of that remedy, before he qualifies as a
"prevailing party." In making the point that no party had benefit-
ted from the litigation, the Rhodes Court carefully noted that
56. 488 U.S. 1 (1988) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id. at 2-3.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 4.
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"[t]he lawsuit [had] not [been] brought as a class action, but by
two plaintiffs."' As in Hewitt, the Court fully examined the effect
of the litigation on the parties to the litigation, but failed to con-
sider the effect of the litigation on the rest of society: Although
the defendant officials had not been able to change their behavior
towards the plaintiffs, they had had to apply procedural and sub-
stantive standards articulated by the district court in treating the
similar requests of other prisoners. Because the parties bringing
the action had reaped no immediate private benefit, the Court
found it inappropriate to award attorney's fees to those par-
ties-despite the substantial immediate public effect of the suit's
outcome on the prison officials' behavior.
D. Farrar v. Hobby
In Farrar v. Hobby, the Court held tightly to the fabricated
distinction of whether a suit's judgment "modifies the defendant's
behavior for the plaintiff's benefit. . . ."I And although in her
concurrence-the fifth vote in a 5-4 decision-Justice O'Connor
went beyond Hewitt and Rhodes by recognizing that a "private
attorney general" theory underlies the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Act of 1976, she firmly refused to accept the consequences of
this recognition.
Farrar arose out of a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
42 U.S.C. § 1985 by Joseph Farrar against then-Lieutenant Gover-
nor of Texas William Hobby, among others.' In the suit, Farrar
alleged that the defendants had violated his civil rights in depriv-
ing him of his liberty and property without due process of law
through malicious prosecution aimed at closing the school he
owned and operated.67 Originally, Farrar sought injunctive relief
and monetary damages; through amendments to the complaint he
62. AM
63. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
64. Id. at 574.
65. Id. at 578 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Md at 570.
67. I. Farrar operated Artesia Hall, a facility for troubled teenagers in Liberty
County, Texas. He was indicted for the murder of one of his students in 1973, for will-
fully failing to provide her with medical treatment and failing to hospitalize her in a
timely fashion. Shortly thereafter, the state of Texas obtained a temporary injunction
closing Artesia Hall. Id.
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dropped, among other things, the claim for injunctive relief.' The
jury found that Hobby had illegally deprived Farrar of a constitu-
tional right, but that the deprivation had not been the proximate
cause of any injury.' Accordingly, the district court ordered the
case dismissed on the merits with no award of any kind.7" On
remand, the Farrars71 were awarded nominal damages; they then
filed an application for attorney's fees under section 1988.' The
district court entered an award of over $300,000, for attorney's
fees and expenses, in favor of the Farrars.3 The Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding that an award of nominal damages did not mean-
ingfully "change the legal relationship" between the defendant and
the plaintiff.'
The Supreme Court, citing, inter alia, Hewitt and Rhodes,
found that nominal damages are sufficient to qualify a plaintiff as
a prevailing party, insofar as "[a] judgment for damages in any
amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the
defendant's behavior for the plaintiff's benefit by forcing the de-
fendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not
pay."75 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, basing
its decision on the assertion that the Farrars "received nominal
damages instead of the $17 million in compensatory damages that
they sought"' and the conclusion that "[t]his litigation accom-
plished little beyond giving petitioners 'the moral satisfaction of
knowing that a federal court concluded that [their] rights had been
violated' in some unspecified way. '
Unlike any opinion in Hewitt and Rhodes, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Farrar referenced the "private attorney general"
theory underlying the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976.
Justice O'Connor even went as far as to term the Act "a tool that
ensures the vindication of important rights. '78 However, she
68. Id
69. 1d
70. Id.
71. Before the case was tried to a jury, Farrar died, and Pat Smith and Dale Farrar,
co-administrators of Farrar's estate, were substituted as plaintiffs. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 571.
75. Id. at 574.
76. IM
77. Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762 (1987)) (alteration in original).
78. Id. at 578 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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quickly dismissed the notion that the Act might be such a tool in
the instant case, claiming that "one searches these facts in vain for
the public purpose this litigation might have served."'' Justice
O'Connor's determinative fifth vote rested on her refusal to ac-
knowledge the public value engendered by the vindication of
Farrar's rights.
III. THE COURT'S MISTAKES: IGNORING THE "PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL" DOCTRINE AND UNDERVALUING
THE VINDICATION OF RIGHTS
To the detriment of the enforcement of our civil rights, the
Court has abandoned Rivera's accurate evaluation of the legislative
intent when determining whether and to what extent civil rights
plaintiffs are "prevailing parties." Civil rights plaintiffs should be
held to have "prevailed" whenever their litigation encourages a
public benefit. Litigation encourages a public benefit when it re-
sults in changed law or governmental policy that mandates greater
respect for citizens' civil rights; it also creates a public benefit
whenever it results in a vindication of rights at the expense of a
rights violator and thereby deters future violations of rights.' If
79. Id.
80. Perhaps Congress thought that the mere pronouncement of a violation of civil
rights would deter future violations of the same ilk because of the sheer compelling force
of judicial edicts. Or perhaps Congress's intent to encourage civil rights plaintiffs was
based on a belief that the public's increased awareness of the defendant's wrongdoing
would precipitate a change through the political process which would deter the defendant
from repeating such violations. For some reason, Congress valued the public service per-
formed by a plaintiff who, through a court's legal pronouncement, demonstrated that a
defendant's bad acts constituted a violation of the plaintiff's civil rights. In the estimation
of the Congress that passed the Act, a public benefit sufficient to qualify a ("private
attorney general") plaintiff as a "prevailing party" results whenever a court vindicates the
plaintiff's rights.
Furthermore, although a legal pronouncement that a plaintiff's civil or constitutional
rights have been violated is sufficient-under the interpretation of the "prevailing party"
requirement proposed here-to qualify the plaintiff as a "prevailing party," such a pro-
nouncement is not necessary-even under the Court's current interpretation-to so qualify
the plaintiff. "Voluntary" action taken by a defendant that confers some benefit on soci-
ety qualifies a "private attorney general" plaintiff as a "prevailing party" just as surely as
a settlement that confers some benefit on the plaintiff qualifies the plaintiff as a "pre-
vailing party." See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
It is interesting to note that if the Court heard a case involving the violation of an
individual's civil or constitutional rights in which the resolution were identical to that of
Alyeska's underlying suit, and if the Court applied its interpretation of the Act's "pre-
vailing party" language, the plaintiff would still be denied attorney's fees. Although such
I
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the Court were to extend its reasoning in Rivera and more gener-
ally recognize Congress's "private attorney general" intent behind
the Act, then the Court-would have to replace its "changing the
legal relationship" standard for qualifying civil rights plaintiffs for
attorney's fees awards with a "vindication of rights" standard. Such
a standard would require the overruling of Hewitt, Rhodes, and
Farrar.
A. Ignoring the "Private Attorney General" Doctrine Underlying
the Act
With devastating results, the Hewitt, Rhodes, and Farrar
Courts all ignored the "private attorney general" theory inherent
in the Act. To rectify its errors in this vein, the Court would have
to recognize that private benefit, while sufficient, is not necessary
to qualify a civil rights plaintiff as a "prevailing party."
The Court should discard Hewitt on two grounds. First, al-
though the Hewitt defendants' qualified immunity had prevented
Helms from obtaining any "relief on the merits,"81 it had not kept
Helms from earning a legal pronouncement that his civil rights had
been violated. On the strength of this legal pronouncement alone,
Helms was a "prevailing party." An award of attorney's fees cou-
pled with this pronouncement would have informed potential rights
violators that their violations would be prosecuted at their own
expense. The fact that public benefit would have been engendered
by consequent deterrence of rights violations should have qualified
Helms as a "prevailing party." Second, the Court should overrule
its holding that the district court need not consider whether or not
Helms's suit had been a "catalyst" for the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Corrections' revision concerning inmate disciplinary hearings.' If
Helms's suit was such a "catalyst," then regardless of the suit's
outcome in court, Helms succeeded in generating the public bene-
fit of reforming the Bureau's disciplinary hearings standards. Just
as a plaintiff may "prevail" under section 1988 by obtaining a
favorable out-of-court settlement that generates some private bene-
a plaintiff would have kept "those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws [from] pro-
ceed[ing] with impunity," S. REp. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910, he would not have obtained the "relief on the merits" which the
Court deems necessary to qualify a plaintiff as a "prevailing party."
81. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759 (1987).
82. Id. at 759, 763.
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fit for the plaintiff, a plaintiff "prevails" by generating a public
benefit through a defendant's "voluntary" action. If Helms's suit
had encouraged the change in policy, which change constituted a
restoration of citizens' civil rights, the suit generated a public ben-
efit quite sufficient to qualify Helms as a "prevailing party."
Rhodes should be discarded because the Court erred in basing
its holding on its finding that no party to the action had benefitted
from the suit brought by plaintiffs Reese and Stewart, incorrectly
stressing the suit's not having been brought as a class action.'
Although the two plaintiffs, one dead and the other released from
prison by the time their case was finally resolved, had not person-
ally benefitted from the improved treatment of prisoners mandated
by the district court, society received a benefit from the court's
vindication of the plaintiffs' rights by virtue of the court's restrain-
ing the defendants from denying other prisoners' constitutional
rights. The direct public benefit engendered by the court's holding
should have been sufficient to qualify the plaintiffs as "prevailing
parties."
The Court should discard Farrar under the first rationale
mentioned above for discarding Hewitt. The judgment in Farrar
that Farrar's civil rights had been violated, which gave rise to the
nominal damages award, had constituted a vindication of Farrar's
rights. As in Hewitt, such a vindication would have generated a
public benefit if coupled with an award of attorney's fees, which
would have resulted in the defendant having been prosecuted at
his own expense. The deterrence of future abuse of citizens' rights
should have qualified Farrar for an award of attorney's fees.
B. Undervaluing the Vindication of Rights
Consideration of Congress's intent in passing the Act leads to
the conclusion that a civil rights plaintiff should be deemed to
qualify for an award of attorney's fees whenever he vindicates his
rights,' rather than, as the Court currently holds, only when he
succeeds in changing the legal relationship between the defendant
and himself. Justice O'Connor seemed to recognize Congress's
83. See supra note 79.
84. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 61.
86. See supra subsection I(B)(2).
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intent in her Farrar concurrence, but she failed nonetheless to
appreciate the richness of any vindication of rights coupled with an
award of attorney's fees.
Justice O'Connor dismissed out-of-hand the idea that the
Farrar litigation served any public purpose, asserting that
one searches these facts in vain for the public purpose this litiga-
tion might have served. The District Court speculated that the
judgment, if accompanied by a large fee award, might deter fu-
ture lawless conduct.., but did not identify the kind of lawless
conduct that might be prevented. Nor is the conduct to be de-
terred apparent from the verdict, which even petitioners acknowl-
edge is "regrettably obtuse. '
Justice O'Conner placed great weight on the district court's failure
to specify the particular public purpose the litigation might have
served or the particular future lawless conduct that might be de-
terred. Yet such oversight was likely due in great part to the
Court's recent indications-i.e., Hewitt and Rhodes-that public
benefit is to be of little concern in assessing a civil rights plaintiff's
success.
In fact, after Justice O'Connor recognized that the Act was
meant to be used as "a tool that ensures the vindication of impor-
tant rights,"' she should have easily concluded that the litigation
provided a valuable public purpose-the vindication of Farrar's
civil rights and the concomitant deterrence of similar rights viola-
tions in the future. Vindication of a plaintiff's civil rights, coupled
with an award of attorney's fees reasonably incurred in the attain-
ment of the vindication, deters future rights violations through the
recognition of the validity of the claimed right'and the declaration
that rights violators will be prosecuted at their own expense.89
Vindication of a plaintiff's civil rights provides the important pub-
lic benefit of deterring future rights violations.
Justice O'Connor was not willing to analyze deterrence under
the rubric provided by Congress; nor was she willing to remand to
the district court so that the trial judge would have that opportuni-
ty. Instead, she pronounced that because the finding that one of
Farrar's civil rights had been violated was "regrettably obtuse,"
there is no public benefit to be gained from the obtaining of such
87. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 578-79 (1992) (O'Connor, 3., concurring).
88. Id. at 578.
89. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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a judgment. By denying Farrar an attorney's fees award, Justice
O'Connor stated, effectively, that Farrar's is not the kind of suit
that is in the public's interest to litigate-that society would be
just as well off if such a suit, with such an outcome, were not
litigated.
By denying the value of the jury's declaration that Farrar had
been the subject of malicious prosecution, Justice O'Connor missed
the opportunity to deter future malicious prosecutions-and dem-
onstrated her unwillingness to recognize the consequences of
Congress's "private attorney general" intent in passing the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976. To prevent such discourage-
ment of appropriate litigation, the Court should distance itself
from Justice O'Connor's concurrence; a vindication of rights should
be recognized as qualifying a civil rights plaintiff for an award of
attorney's fees incurred in the attainment of such a vindication.
C. Ramifications of Recognizing the "Private Attorney General"
and "Vindication of Rights" Precepts
Consider again the hypothetical featured in the Introduction.
Joe's rights were vindicated: Upon the entry of judgment in his
civil rights suit, he obtained a judicial pronouncement that his civil
rights had been violated. Yet under the Supreme Court's current
interpretation of the Act's "prevailing party" language, the trial
court would not be able to award Joe attorney's fees. This result
would not be conducive to effecting Congress's aspiration of eradi-
cating civil rights abuse. Attorneys would become increasingly
hesitant to take on clients like Joe. Despite these clients' legiti-
mate claims of having suffered violations of their civil rights, the
likelihood that either the client would not be able to pay or that
the court would not award attorney's fees would result in these
clients' inability to obtain legal representation in these important
cases. To accord with Congress's intent in passing the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, the Court must re-construe the "pre-
vailing party" language of the Act so that civil rights plaintiffs
with valid claims are encouraged to aid in the eradication of civil
rights abuse.
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act
of 1976 clearly indicates that civil rights plaintiffs are "private at-
torneys general"; as such, they "prevail" whenever they generate a
public benefit. Furthermore, the legislative history specifically pro-
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vides that a "vindication of rights" constitutes such a public bene-
fit. Adhering to these precepts expressed in the legislative history
would require the Supreme Court to abandon its requirement that
a plaintiff receive "some relief on the merits" before he "prevails."
Instead, the Court would have to recognize that a plaintiff-who
either has obtained a legal pronouncement that his civil rights
were violated or has encouraged a defendant to change "volun-
tarily" his behavior to society's advantage-has "prevailed" and
thus is eligible for an award of the legal fees generated in obtain-
ing the pronouncement or encouraging the behavioral, change.
Such a pronouncement certainly occurs whenever a plaintiff re-
ceives some relief on the merits; but it also occurs in many cases,
such as Hewitt, Rhodes, and Farrar, when there is significant pub-
lic, albeit no recognizable private, benefit.
IV. CONCLUSION
To accord with legislative intent, the Court must further ex-
plore the "private attorney general" theory underlying the Act
which it recognized in Rivera. Contrary to Justice Scalia's assertion
in Hewitt, a plaintiff qualifies as a "prevailing party" long before,
and regardless of whether, he "receives some relief on the merits
of his claim." Rather, a civil rights plaintiff is a "private attorney
general" who becomes eligible for an award of attorney's fees
under section 1988 as soon as he "vindicates" his rights. Such a
plaintiff obtains such a "vindication of rights" upon either earning
a legal pronouncement that his rights have been violated or caus-
ing the defendant to "voluntarily" change his behavior to the
advantage of either the plaintiff himself or society as a whole.
Seeking to encourage the enforcement of everyone's civil rights,
Congress intended to compensate not just those plaintiffs who
succeed in ensuring the maintenance of their own rights, but also
those who succeed in ensuring the maintenance of the rights of all.
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